Introduction
The recent literature on monetary policy has focused on policy rules in which the interest rate is the chosen policy instrument, and a major finding is that the form of the interest-rate rule is crucial for inducing key desirable properties of the economy. For example, setting the interest rate based only on exogenous fundamental variables leads to instability problems if in fact private agents do not a priori have rational expectations (RE) but instead form expectations using standard adaptive learning rules. This was recently demonstrated by (Evans and Honkapohja 2003) in the context of the New Keynesian model that has become a standard framework in recent research on monetary policy.
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Another difficulty with such interest-rate rules is that they imply indeterminacy of rational expectations equilibria (REE). In other words, there exist other REE near the "fundamental" REE, which can depend on extraneous factors solely through private expectations, see e.g. Interest-rate rules that react only to observable exogenous variables can be viewed as "open-loop" policies, since they do not respond to variables that are endogenous to the economy. Making the interest rate depend on lagged endogenous variables, including possibly the lagged interest rate itself, may or may not provide a remedy to these problems. On this point see (Evans and Honkapohja 2002b) and determinacy of the desired solution. In this paper we first review the results for this "expectations-based" policy rule.
Our recommended implementation of optimal policy is, by its nature, a "closed-loop" policy that requires considerable information. In particular, our policy rule depends on obtaining accurate measurements of both private expectations and exogenous shocks, and is based on a correct specification of the structural model and known values of key structural parameters. Our results are easily summarized. Based on numerical calculations for calibrated New Keynesian models, we find that the Friedman k−percent rule appears to induce both determinacy and stability under learning. Thus this open-loop money supply rule does meet some key requirements for a desirable monetary policy. We then turn to consideration of its performance in terms of the usual policy objective function based on expected quadratic loss. Comparing its welfare loss to that of the optimal policy, we find substantially poorer performance of the k−percent rule. Thus Friedman's rule appears unsatisfactory in this standard model incorporating monopolistic competition and price stickiness.
The Model
We use the standard log-linearized New Keynesian model as the analytical framework, see e.g. (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 1999) for details and references to the original nonlinear models that lead to this linearization. The model contains two behavioral equations of the private sector:
is the "IS" curve derived from the Euler equation for consumer optimization and π denote the private sector expectations of the output gap and inflation next period. Since our focus is on learning behavior, these expectations need not be rational (E t without * denotes RE). The parameters ϕ and λ are positive and β is the discount factor of the firms so that 0 < β < 1.
For simplicity, the shocks g t and u t are assumed to be observable random shocks, where g
where
) are independent white noise. g t represents shocks to government purchases and as well as to potential output. u t represents any cost push shocks to marginal costs other than those entering through x t . To simplify the analysis, we also assume throughout the paper that shocks µ and ρ are known (if not, these parameters could be made subject to learning).
It remains to specify how monetary policy is conducted.
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There are two natural possibilities for the choice of the monetary instrument: the interest rate and the money supply. We consider each in turn, starting with the former.
Optimal Interest-Rate Setting
We consider an interest-rate policy that is derived explicitly to maximize a policy objective function. This is frequently taken to be of the quadratic loss form, i.e. 
whereπ is the inflation target. This type of optimal policy is often called "flexible inflation targeting" in the current literature, see e.g. (Svensson 1999) and (Svensson 2001) . α is the relative weight on the output target and strict inflation targeting would be the case α = 0. The policy maker is assumed to have the same discount factor β as the private sector.
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We remark that the presence of the two shocks g t and u t makes the problem of policy optimization non-trivial, since policy has only a single instrument, the interest rate or the money supply, under its control. The u t shock is particularly troublesome as it leads to a trade-off between the variability of the output gap and the variability of inflation.
The literature on optimal policy distinguishes between optimal policy under commitment and discretion, e.g. compare (Evans and Honkapohja 2002b) and (Evans and Honkapohja 2003) . Under commitment the policy maker can do better because commitment can have effects on private expectations beyond those achieved under discretion. Solving the problem of minimizing (4), subject to (2) holding in every period, leads to a series of first order conditions for the optimal dynamic policy. This policy exhibits time inconsistency, in the sense that policy makers would have an incentive to deviate from the policy in the future. However, this policy performs better than discretionary policy.
Assuming that the policy has been initiated at some point in the past and settingπ = 0 without loss of generality, the first-order condition specifies
in every period.
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In contrast the corresponding policy under discretion specifies λπ t + αx t = 0. We will focus on the commitment case, which delivers superior performance.
Condition (5) for optimal policy with commitment is not a complete specification of monetary policy, since one must still determine an i t rule (also called a "reaction function") that implements the policy. It turns out that a number of interest-rate rules are consistent with the model (1)-(2), the optimality condition (5), and rational expectations. Some of the ways of implementing "optimal" monetary policy make the economy vulnerable to 
either indeterminacy or instability under learning or both, while other implementations are robust to these difficulties. For an overview see (Evans and Honkapohja 2002a). Expectations-based optimal rules are advocated in (Evans and Honkapohja 2002b), who argue that observable private expectations should be appropriately incorporated into the interest-rate rule. If this is done, it can be shown that the REE will be stable under learning and thus optimal policy can be successfully implemented. The desired rule is obtained by combining the IS curve (1), the price setting equation (2) and the first-order optimality condition (5), treating the private expectations as given. Eliminating x t and π t from these equations, but not imposing the rational expectations assumption, leads to an interest-rate equation
under commitment with coefficients
.
Given the interest-rate rule (6) we can obtain the reduced from of the model and study its properties. The reduced form is
the reduced form (7) can be written as
for appropriate matrices M , N and P . We are interested in the determinacy (uniqueness) of the stationary RE solution and the stability under learning of the REE of interest. The next section outlines these concepts and the methodology for assessing determinacy and stability under learning for multivariate models such as (7).
Methodology: Determinacy and Stability under Learning

Determinacy
The first issue of concern is whether under rational expectations the system possesses a unique stationary REE, in which case the model is said to be "determinate." If instead the model is "indeterminate," there exist multiple stationary solutions and these will include undesirable "sunspot solutions", i.e. REE depending on extraneous random variables that influence the economy solely through the expectations of the agents. Formally, in the determinate case the unique stationary solution for the model (8) takes the "minimal state variable" (or MSV) form
for appropriate values (a, b, c) = (0,b,c). In the indeterminate case there are multiple stationary solutions of this form, as well as non-MSV REE. The general methodology for ascertaining determinacy is given in the Appendix to Chapter 10 of (Evans and Honkapohja 2001). The procedure is to rewrite the model in first-order form and compare the number of non-predetermined variables with the number of roots of the forward looking matrix that lie inside the unit circle. For reduced form (7) Because this model has one predetermined variable, i.e. x L t , the condition for determinacy is that exactly two eigenvalues of J lie inside the unit circle and one eigenvalue outside. If one or no roots lie inside the unit circle (with the other roots outside), the model is indeterminate.
Stability Under Learning
The second basic issue for models of the form (8) concerns stability under adaptive learning. If private agents follow an adaptive learning rule, will the RE solution of interest be stable, i.e. reached asymptotically by the learning process? If not, the REE is unlikely to be reached because the specified policy is potentially destabilizing.
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As is usual in the literature, we specifically model learning by agents as taking the form of least squares estimates of parameters that are updated recursively as new data are generated.
To examine stability under least squares learning we treat (9) as the Perceived Law of Motion (PLM) of the agents, i.e. as the form of their econometric model, and assume that agents estimate its coefficients a, b, c using the available data. (9) (0,b,c) . It can be shown that the E-stability principle gives the conditions for local convergence of least squares learning. In what follows, we exploit this connection between convergence of learning dynamics and E-stability.
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To define E-stability we compute the mapping from the PLM to the Actual Law of Motion (ALM) as follows. The expectations corresponding to (9), for given parameter values (a, b, c), are given by
where we are treating the information set available to the agents, when forming expectations, as including v (Alternative information assumptions are straightforward to consider). This leads to the mapping from PLM to ALM given by
E-stability is determined by local asymptotic stability of REE (0,b,c) under the differential equation
and the E-stability conditions govern stability under least squares learning. The stability conditions can be stated in terms of the derivative matrices
where ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product andb denotes the REE value of b. The necessary and sufficient condition for E-stability is that all eigenvalues of DT 
Results for Optimal interest-rate Setting
Monetary policy that is based on the optimal interest-rate rule (6) will lead to both determinacy and stability and learning. (Evans and Honkapohja 2002b) prove the following results to this effect.
Proposition 1 Under the expectations-based reaction function (6) the REE is determinate for all structural parameter values.
It is clearly a desirable property of our proposed monetary policy rule that it does not permit the existence of other suboptimal stationary REE. However, having a determinate REE does not ensure that it is attainable under learning and we next consider this issue for the economy under the interest-rate rule (6).
Proposition 2 Under the expectations-based reaction function (6), the optimal REE is stable under learning for all structural parameter values.
We remark that the expectations-based rule (6) obeys a form of the Taylor principle since δ π > 1. Partial intuition for Proposition 2 can be seen from the reduced form (7). An increase in inflation expectations leads to an increase in actual inflation that is smaller than the change in expectations since αβ/(α+ λ 2 ) < 1, where the dampening effect arises from the interest-rate reaction to changes in E * t π t + 1
and is a crucial element of the stability result.
1 0
Friedman's Money Supply Rule
Friedman's rule stipulates that the nominal money supply is increased by a constant percentage k from one period to the next. In logarithms the nominal money supply M t must thus satisfy
where M is a constant, k is the percentage increase in money supply and w t denotes a random noise term, which is assumed to be white noise for simplicity. The demand for real balances is assumed to depend positively on the output gap x t and negatively on the nominal interest rate i t and a possible iid random shock e t . The money market equilibrium or LM curve can then be written as
where p t is the log of the price level. This yields the formula
for the nominal interest rate. Substituting (18) into the IS curve (1) leads to the expression
which together with the New Phillips curve (2) and the definition of the inflation rate p
yield the model to be analyzed. We first consider the perfect foresight steady state when there are no random shocks. It is easily computed as 
The inverse of the matrix on the left hand side of (21) 
Introducing the vector notation
we write (22) in the general form
Determinacy
Analysis of determinacy of the model can be done using the same general methodology that was outlined in Section 3.1.1 for study of the model with interest-rate setting. Examining the reduced form (22) we note that the model has one predetermined variable p ) and the matrices A and B are those specified by (24). Determinacy obtains when exactly three eigenvalues of the matrix A − 1 B are inside the unit circle. It is evident from (24) that it would be difficult to obtain general theoretical results on determinacy, and we thus examine the issue numerically. Result 3 The Friedman k−percent rule leads to determinacy of equilibria.
We have expressed this as a "result" rather than a proposition because it has been verified only for the two calibrated examples.
Stability Under Learning
As discussed above in Section 3.1.2, we can focus on E-stability of the (determinate) REE in model (22) where the parameter vector a and the matrices C and K are in general not equal to the REE values. Agents forecast using the PLM, which leads to forecast functions
This forecast function is substituted into (23), which yields the temporary equilibrium given the forecasts or the actual law of motion (ALM)
The E-stability condition is that all eigenvalues of the matrices
have real parts less than one. ⊗ again denotes the Kronecker product. Analytical results on E-stability cannot be obtained in view of the complexity of the model. We thus evaluated numerically the eigenvalues of these matrices using the calibrated examples specified above. We conclude:
Result 4 Under the Friedman k−percent rule the REE is stable under learning.
Welfare Comparison
We now compare the performance of the Friedman rule to optimal policy under commitment. Compared to the optimal policy the Friedman rule delivers quite poor welfare results, at least for these calibrations. 
Concluding Remarks
We began by reviewing the results on optimal interest-rate policy, and presented an implementation that achieves both determinacy and stability under learning of the optimal REE. This optimal policy rule relies on strong feedback from the expectations of private agents, and also requires knowledge of key structural parameters for the economy. Clearly, these are strong informational requirements. However, simpler open-loop interest-rate rules, for example those depending only on exogenous shocks, fail to be stable under learning and also suffer from indeterminacy problems. Friedman's money supply rule has a major advantage in terms of simplicity. We first examined whether the Friedman k−percent money supply rule leads to determinacy of equilibria. Due to the complexity of the model, analytical results were not obtainable. However, numerical analysis indicated that Friedman's rule does lead to determinate equilibria. We then considered whether the unique stationary REE is stable under learning. Here we employed the concept of E-stability which is known to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for convergence of least squares learning rules. Again, numerical analysis showed that Friedman's money supply rule delivers an REE that is stable under learning. Finally, we studied the performance of Friedman's rule in terms of the quadratic objective function that can approximate the welfare loss of the economy. In both calibrations of the model, Friedman's rule leads to high welfare losses relative to those that are attained when monetary policy is conducted in terms of the optimal interest-rate rule.
We conclude that, while Friedman's money supply rule performs well in terms of determinacy and stability under learning, its performance is relatively poor in terms of welfare loss. According to these results, the choice of the monetary instrument presents a dilemma. If a simple open loop policy is desired, the money supply provides a superior instrument relative to the interest rate since the latter fails the basic tests of determinacy and learnability. Yet in terms of welfare loss, an open loop money supply policy delivers poor results. There may exist simple money supply feedback policies that are much better in terms of attained welfare, but whether they would pass the basic tests of determinacy and learnability is a question that would need to be explicitly examined.
